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REFERENCES TO THE RECORD 
All references to the Record on appeal, as paginated by the 
trial court clerk, are designated as "R". 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This appeal was poured-over to the Court of Appeals for 
disposition by the Supreme Court of Utah on March 8, 1996. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it 
granted Robert M. Mills and Donna H. Mills summary judgment without 
considering disputes of material facts contained in the parties' 
affidavits? 
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error in 
interpreting an unclear, incomplete and ambiguous contract in a 
summary judgment proceeding? 
3. Did the trial court commit reversible error in failing to 
recognize that equitable estoppel and part performance are valid 
defenses to the statute of frauds in Utah? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is correctness, without deference to 
the trial court. In deciding whether the trial court correctly 
determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact, this 
Court should review the facts and inferences drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the losing party. Canfield v. Albertsons, 
841 P.2d 1224, 1224-25 (Utah App. 1992) 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 
In addition to the documents before the trial court, the file 
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contained a number of admissions to factual allegations in the 
Memoranda. Those admissions were available to the trial court and 
are noted in this section. Among the pleadings cited below are the 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Mills Memo"); the Affidavit of Robert M. Mills ("Mills Aff."); 
and the Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment ("Brody Memo"). 
The following are the undisputed material facts which were 
before the trial court at the time it rendered its decision: 
The Option to Purchase was drafted by Mr. Pat Brody, husband to defendant, 
Jana Jean Brody. (R60, Mills Aff HL3; R30, Mills Memo Fact 55/ R76, 
admitted in Brody Memo us; The written Option was to expire by its terms 
within 24 months of the 15th day of February, 1993. (R9, Option Agreement; 
R13f admitted In \8 Brody Counterclaim) The Option price was fixed at 
$155,000.00. (R9t Option Agreement; R13, admitted In 5# Brody 
Counterclaim) The Option Agreement requires no advanced notice of its 
exercise. (R9r Option Agreement; R39, Mills Memo, \7 ; R76, admitted 
In Brody Memo I 7) 
In June of 1994, Brody notified the Mills of her intent to exercise the Option. 
(R63, document as Ex "A" to Mills Aff; R60, Mills Aff. \6; R40, 
Mills Memo \10; R77, admitted In Brody Memo, %10) In that same 
month, the Mills granted a limited power of attorney to their attorney, Jeffrey C. 
Swinton, to close the transaction. (R63, copy of power of attorney; R60, 
Mills Aff. 5 7 ; R40, Mills Memo, mil; R77, admitted In Brody Memo, 
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\11) The Mills then notified the Brodys in a letter dated June 14,1994, that Mr. 
Swinton had been appointed the Mills' attorney to close the transaction on their 
behalf. (R60, Mills Aff. H8; R40, Mills Memo, \12, pg 3; R77, 
admitted In Brody Memo, HI 2) 
The June 14th letter from Mills to Brodys suggested the Brodys contact Mr. 
Swinton to make arrangements for the closing. (R55, letter as Ex "B" to 
Mills Memo; R40, Mills Memo, \13; R77, admitted In Brody Memo, H13) 
The Brodys did not intend to remain in the condominium but planned to 
move from the condominium and listed it for sale "for several months prior to the 
15th day of February, 1995." (R61, Mills Aff. m i ; R41, Mills Memo, \16; 
R77, admitted in Brody Memo, \16) The written lease expired by its terms 
on March 1,1995. (R4-8, Lease) The written lease was orally extended into 
March, 1995, and the Mills were required to rent an apartment to live in until the 
Condominium was vacated by Brodys. (R61, Mills Aff. \14; R41, Mills 
Memo, \21; R78, admitted In Brody Memo, \21) A letter dated February 
10,1995, signed by Mr. Brody, was Federal Expressed to the Mills on February 13, 
1995, and received by them on February 14th. That letter stated "we will be 
exercising our option to purchase the condominium." (R41, Mills Memo, Hi 7; 
R77, admitted In Brody Memo, \17 ; R56-57, letter and receipt, Ex 
"C" to Mills Memo; letter only at Exhibit #2 to Appellant' s Brief) 
There was no written extension to the Option Agreement. (All pleadings) 
$155,000.00 was not delivered to Mills on or before February 15,1995. (see 
every pleading) Brody did not tender payment of the purchase price before 
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the expiration of the Option period. (R4ir Mills Memo, $18; R77, admitted 
in Brody Memo, f ifi; On the 15th day of February 1995, Mills' counsel sent 
a letter to Brody indicating that the Option had expired and that the Mills intended 
to return to Salt Lake and live in the condominium. (R41, Mills Memo, $19; 
R77, admitted In Brody Memo, \19; R58, letter as Ex "D" to Mills 
Memo) Brody made no rental payments to the Mills or into escrow after March 
15,1995- (R41, Mills Memo, \20; R77, admitted In Brody Memo, \20) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court took the view, based upon a 197 9 Utah Supreme 
Court decision, that in the state of Utah when an option agreement 
for the purchase of real property is silent regarding when and how 
the purchase price is to be paid, it must be paid in full at the 
time the option is exercised. That interpretation of the law was 
not appealed and is not presently before this Court. 
To reach its decision on Summary Judgment, the trial court 
needed only satisfy itself of a few very narrow and undisputed 
facts. The fundamental issue was whether the purchase price for 
the property was either delivered or even tendered before the 
Option Agreement expired. Of that there is no dispute. In fact, 
none of the facts necessary to satisfy the court were in dispute. 
They were either clear on the face of documents or admitted freely 
in the pleadings. The matter was ripe for and deserved to be dealt 
with on Summary Judgment. 
Appellant claims that the Option Agreement, drafted by her 
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husband, was ambiguous, unclear, or incomplete and therefore the 
matter should have been interpreted by a jury rather than by the 
trial court on Summary Judgment. Appellant fails to point out that 
she had not requested a jury and this was a matter to be ultimately 
decided solely by the court. 
The trial court drew from precedent in this State and 
correctly ruled that an option agreement with a fixed price but 
without a provision as to how and when payments would be made is 
not ambiguous as a matter of law. It merely requires payment of 
the fixed price at the time it is exercised. 
Appellant then argues that because the Option Agreement did 
not include an integration clause the burden was on Appellees to 
show that the Option Agreement and its attached lease agreement 
were intended to be the complete contract between the parties. 
There is a presumption in the state of Utah that when the parties 
have reduced to writing what appears to be a complete and certain 
agreement, that it will be conclusively presumed that the writing 
contains the whole of the agreement. The court was clearly within 
its right to find that the Option Agreement and its attached lease 
represented the entire agreement between the parties, There was 
absolutely no evidence presented to the trial court of negotiations 
or agreements entered into prior to the time the contract was 
signed. 
Next, Appellant raises, for the very first time here on 
appeal, defenses of promissory estoppel and part performance. 
Neither those theories nor those words were ever uttered in court 
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or written in pleadings before this matter came up on appeal. An 
appellate court cannot consider issues on appeal that were not 
raised below. These new issues are apparent defenses to the 
statute of frauds which likely influenced the court's decision. 
Even if those defenses had been raised timely, the statute of 
frauds precludes any oral extension (promissory estoppel) of a 
written option to purchase real property. 
The only evidence of part performance was reference to a phone 
call (which Appellant's concede might have been made after the 
expiration of the option) by Appellant's husband to a title company 
to open a file for a future closing. The Appellants suggest that 
they made unspecified improvements to the property and provided 
absolutely no detail. No payments were made to or for the benefit 
of the Appellees by way of part performance. 
Therefore, even if these defenses had been timely raised, they 
are without substance. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT BEFORE 
THE TRIAL COURT: 
The trial court concluded that: "The Option required payment 
of the entire purchase price within the Option period"; and, "The 
Brodys did not timely exercise the Option." 
Without question the most important fact which the lower Court 
considered in arriving at those conclusions was that $155,000.00 
was not delivered to Mills or even to their attorney on or before 
February 15, 1995. This entire matter rests on whether the Brodys 
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exercised the Option on or prior to February 15, 1995. There are 
no facts in dispute on that singular issue. The issue before the 
lower Court was one of law. 
The case of Hoffman v. Sullivan, 599 P.2d 505 (Utah 1979) 
dealt with the repudiation of an option which stated that it could 
not be exercised by its terms before the expiration date of a lease 
on October 15, 19 77. A letter from lessee's attorney was sent one 
month before that expiration date, written on September 19, 1977, 
and said: 
"I realize that this option cannot be exercised 
before the expiration of the lease on October 15, 1977, 
and this notice to you is expressly intended to serve as 
an exercise of the option on that date." (Id. at 507, 
emphasis added) 
Both the lessor and her attorney wrote back in response 
stating that she was going to stay in her condominium and it would 
not be sold. The court then noted that the responses of lessor and 
lessor's attorney comprised no denial of the right to purchase, but 
"simply a flat refusal to sell . . .". The court held that the 
lessee at that point did not need to pay or even tender the 
purchase price in light of the prior repudiation. The lessor 
claimed in that case, as Brody has done in this one, that the 
Option was unenforceable due to ambiguity because "there was no 
provision made as to how and when payments would be made". Faced 
with that question, the Utah Supreme Court clarified Utah law and 
ruled that there was no ambiguity because: 
"In general, such a provision calls for payment of 
cash at the time of the exercise of the option; hence, as 
a matter of law, there was no ambiguity as to how and 
when payments would be made. " (Id. at 508, emphasis added) 
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Until the filing of Brody's Motion before this Court, no one 
had claimed that the contract at issue in this case was ambiguous 
because it does not state when payment was to be made. Utah law is 
clear. "Such a provision calls for payment of cash at the time of 
the exercise of the option." (Sullivan at 508) That is supported 
by the two week gap between when the Option was to be exercised and 
the last date for occupancy under the lease. The Mills initially 
contemplated arriving home around March 1, 1995, and, in the event 
the Brodys timely purchased the condominium, intended and needed to 
use the entire cash proceeds, either themselves or through one with 
their power of attorney, to purchase another home to occupy upon 
their return. 
Instead, all the Mills received was a non-committal letter 
bearing a date of February 10 (but inexplicably not sent via 
Federal Express until February 13th) and delivered to the Mills on 
the last day of the 24 month option period, February 14, 1995. 
That letter was signed by Mr. Brody and stated only "we will be 
exercising our option". No details, no specifics, and most 
importantly, no money. There was no repudiation by the Mills prior 
to the expiration of the option period. The Brodys knew for 10 
months that the Mills had given a power of attorney to an attorney 
in Salt Lake to close the transaction before the 15th of February 
and admitted in this case having received the letter disclosing 
that information. 
As the expiration date of the Option drew near, it became 
clear that the Brodys couldn't buy the home themselves and, by 
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their own admission, listed it for sale several months before 
February 15, 1995. They were still holding open houses after the 
Option expired hoping to find a buyer to give them the money to 
exercise the Option. Perhaps they believed the letter suggesting 
that they "will be exercising our option" would pacify the Mills 
and give the Brodys time to finalize a sale. 
Simply stated, the Option was not exercised. Because it was 
not exercised, the lease period expired and the Brodys were 
determined to be tenants-at-will of the Mills. They were 
unlawfully holding over without payment of rent. 
The trial court had before it sufficient undisputed material 
facts to make its decision. The inferences from and allusions to 
other facts Appellant claims were important are red herrings. 
There is no genuine dispute as to any material issue of fact. 
II. THE COURT DID NOT ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRET THE CONTRACT ON 
THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE IT WAS NOT AMBIGUOUS, 
UNCLEAR, OR INCOMPLETE 
Brody complains that "the trial court committed manifest error 
in interpreting an ambiguous contract instead of allowing it to go 
to a jury for interpretation." (Emphasis added) First, it should 
be noted that neither party requested a jury in this matter so the 
only trier of fact would have always been Judge Wilkinson, rather 
than a jury. 
Second, the Option contract was neither unclear, incomplete, 
nor ambiguous. In its ruling that the Option required payment 
within the Option period, the trial court likely relied upon the 
language in Sullivan, supra, wherein the Supreme Court held, as a 
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matter of law, that an option contract with a fixed price and 
without a provision as to how and when payments would be made is 
not ambiguous. 
"The trial court's finding that there was ambiguity 
in the option provision because there was 'no provision, 
. . made as to how and when payments would be made' is 
insupportable. The option price was fixed, and as to 
that there was no dispute. In general, such a provision 
calls for payment of cash at the time of the exercise of 
the option; hence, as a matter of law, there was no 
ambiguity as to how and when payments would be made. " 
(Sullivan at 508, emphasis added) 
Brody complains that because the Option Agreement drafted by 
her husband did not contain an integration clause extrinsic 
evidence should be considered to interpret what it meant. There 
was no evidence introduced in the trial court that the written 
lease and its attached Option agreement did not incorporate all 
prior negotiations of the parties. In the case of State Bank of 
Lehi v. Woolsev, 565 p. 2d 413, 419 (Utah 1977) the court reiterated 
a commonly accepted presumption. 
"The court properly adhered to the principle that 
when the parties have reduced to writing what appears to 
be a complete and certain agreement, it will be 
conclusively presumed, in the absence of fraud, that the 
writing contains the whole of the agreement between the 
parties." 
There has been no allegation of fraud on the part of Mills and 
the Court properly noted that the Option agreement was drafted by 
Pat Brody, husband of the Appellant. The Option was clear and 
unambiguous and therefore requires no extrinsic evidence to aid in 
its interpretation. 
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III. THERE WAS NO ERROR IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE PROMISSORY 
ESTOPPEL AND PART PERFORMANCE BECAUSE NEITHER OF THOSE DEFENSES 
WERE RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW. 
These claimed defenses spin off of the trial court's likely 
reflection upon the statute of frauds relating to the claimed oral 
extension of the Option agreement. Courts in this state have dealt 
with cases involving conflicting interpretation of oral agreements 
following written agreements dealing with real estate. One case 
with unique similarities to our case is Wardley Corp. v. Burgess,. 
810 P. 2d 476 (Utah App. 1991). In that case a six month written 
listing agreement expired on January 26, 1989. The listing agent 
claimed that Burgess, the property owner, orally extended the 
listing agreement on that last day. 
"Burgess, on the other hand, asserts that he did not 
extend the agreement. Appellants therefore claim that 
there was a genuine dispute as to whether the listing 
agreement was extended and that summary judgment should 
not have been granted." (pg 4 77) 
Sound familiar? The court, in dealing with the factual 
dispute stated at 407: 
"Despite the apparent factual dispute as to whether 
Burgess did or did not orally agree to an extension of 
the listing agreement, summary judgment was appropriate 
because any extension to the listing agreement falls 
within the ambit of the statute of frauds." 
The Court then noted, again at 407: 
"The rule is well settled in Utah that if an 
original agreement is within the statute of frauds, a 
subsequent agreement which modifies the original written 
agreement must also satisfy the requirements of the 
statute of frauds to be enforceable. Golden Key Realty, 
Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985)." 
Finally, at 408 the Wardley Court ruled: 
"We therefore hold that even if the parties orally 
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agreed to extend the duration of the listing agreement, 
as asserted by appellants, the agreement to extend was 
void under the statute of frauds. The trial court 
therefore did not err in awarding summary judgment to 
Burgess. 
'While this may seem a harsh result, it does not 
require our apology- The very adoption of a statute of 
frauds reflects the Legislature's considered judgment 
that, with certain kinds of important arrangements, it is 
preferable to invalidate a few otherwise legitimate 
agreements because they were not written than to burden 
the system and the citizenry with claims premised on 
bogus, unwritten agreements-' (last quoting from the case 
of Machan Hampshire Properties, Inc. v. Western Real 
Estate and Development Co., 77 9 P. 2d 230 (Utah App. 
1989) ) 
Now, looking to the law of enforcement of oral contracts 
relative to the sale of an interest in land, and defenses to the 
statute of frauds, remember, we are here dealing with a written 
contract. The only "oral" part thereof under scrutiny is the oral 
phone conversation between Brody's husband (not a party to the 
Agreement) and Robert Mills on or about February 9, 19 95. The 
parties differ dramatically on what was said and what was agreed to 
at that moment, but it is interesting to examine the written 
follow-up letter drafted and signed solely by Mr. Brody sometime 
between February 10 and February 13. That letter bears a date of 
February 10, 19 95, and is attached to Appellant's Brief as Exhibit 
"2". Reading that letter please note the following: 
1. There is no reference to the phone conversation. 
2. Pat Brody speaks as if he had never had any recent 
conversation with the Mills when he begins "I hope you enjoyed your 
mission. . ." 
3. There is no reference to any prior oral agreement having 
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been reached regarding either the exercise or an extension of the 
option. It is as if the topic had never been discussed when Mr. 
Brody says: "I just wanted to let you know that we will be 
excercising (sic) our option to purchase the condominium." One 
reading that letter without other background would find no evidence 
that there had been any prior discussion or agreement on those 
matters. It is written as if it is an announcement for the first 
time--which it was. 
4. Mr. Brody invited the Mills to select a title company in 
the letter but later asserts in his affidavit that his contacting 
a title company to set up a closing was evidence of part 
performance. 
Turning now to the specific defenses of "Promissory Estoppel" 
and "Part Performance" raised by Brody, first it should be noted 
that those defenses were raised just now, before this Court, and 
were never at issue and never discussed before the lower Court. 
There is no referenge to either of them in the pleadings. 
The lower court has no obligation to raise and rule on 
defenses that are never set before it. So, likewise, an appellate 
court cannot consider issues on appeal that were not raised below. 
In LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel Enterprises, 823 P. 2d 479 (Utah App. 
1991) this Court has said: 
"To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party 
must timely bring the issue to the attention of the trial 
court, thus providing the court an opportunity to rule on 
the issue's merits. See Turtle Management, Inc. v. 
Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982); 
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801-02 (Utah App. 1987). 
'Issues not raised in the trial court in timely fashion 
are deemed waived, precluding [the appellate court] from 
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considering their merits on appeal.' Salt Lake County v. 
Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah App. 1989); accord 
Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 837 
(Utah 1984); Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 
P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). Further, the mere mention 
of an issue in the pleadings, when no supporting evidence 
or relevant legal authority is introduced at trial in 
support of the claim, is insufficient to raise an issue 
at trial and thus insufficient to preserve the issue for 
appeal. James, 746 P.2d at 801." 
Relating to the issues, now raised, of equitable estoppel and 
part performance, Brody, in retrospect, has discovered that 
allegations in her husband's affidavit lend support, retroactively, 
to defenses that were never raised below. It is too late to raise 
them now. 
In the event this Court finds that they were raised below and 
should be considered, there are a multitude of Utah cases which 
have addressed the issue of enforcement of oral real estate 
contracts, several are worthy of attention. The case of Holmgren 
Brothers, Inc. v Ballard, 534 P. 2d 611, 614 (Utah 1975) sets forth 
the guidelines for enforcement of an oral contract relating to real 
property. 
The oral contract and its terms must be clear, 
understood, and established by clear, unequivocal and 
definite testimony, or other evidence of the same 
quality.. . . (1) Any improvements made must be 
substantial, or valuable, or beneficial. . . (4) Such 
acts as are relied on must be exclusively referable to 
the contract. 
And on page 615: 
It only needs to be said that without an oral 
contract, its terms, and a mutual understanding, being 
proved by clear, unequivocal and definite evidence, there 
is no contract to which the claimed acts of part 
performance could apply, nor is there a contract which 
the court could enforce. 
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(See also Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982) and 
Coleman v. Dillman, 624 P. 2d 713 (Utah 1981)) 
Brody argues part performance by having contacted a title 
company to set up a closing for the third week in March, No tender 
of any money to the Mills. Even if a phone call to a title company 
were sufficient "part performance" to establish any rights, there 
is no evidence that the call was made before the expiration of the 
Option period. Remember, Mr. Brody invited the Mills to select a 
title company in his letter which they received on the final day 
for exercising the option. There has been no allegation below 
regarding when that call was allegedly made. Mr. Brody's Affidavit 
places it, relative to the February 9, 1995, phone call, as being 
"at sometime thereafter" (Brody Aff. 511, R90). It should be 
remembered that all parties have acknowledged that a letter 
formally notifying Brody that the Option had expired was sent to 
them on February 15th by which it was made abundantly clear that 
the Mills considered the Option to have lapsed. Any actions taken 
thereafter were not "referable to the contract" (Holmgren at 614). 
In support of her belated theory of part performance, Brody 
cites the case of Holt v. Katsanevas, 854 P. 2d 575 (Utah App. 
1993). In that case the court found that the transfer to and 
plaintiff's acceptance of substituted collateral coupled with the 
grant of permission for defendant to pay, and the payment by the 
defendant of $46,000.00 to pay off a pre-existing Continental Bank 
loan were sufficient part performance. That is a far cry from a 
phone call on a date unsupported in the record. There is no 
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allegation of having incurred one cent of additional expense in 
that effort. The Holt standard, as recited by Brody, is 
"sufficient performance". A single phone call to a title company 
to set up a future closing cannot be viewed as "sufficient 
performance". 
Brody further argues having made "improvements to the 
condominium in anticipation of purchasing the property" without 
ever stating what those improvements were, who paid for them, when 
they were made, or how they benefitted the property. There is no 
evidence to substantiate that claim and certainly nothing that 
could arise to the level of the facts in Holt. 
The defenses of part performance and estoppel fail to 
counterbalance the overriding wisdom and force of the statute of 
frauds. The defenses of promissory estoppel and part performance, 
raised only now for the first time, are too late and wholly 
unsupported. 
CONCLUSION 
This is a case where there is no genuine issue at to any truly 
material fact necessary for the trial court to have made its 
summary decision. The Option was not ambiguous when drafted. It 
required payment of the predetermined purchase price prior to its 
expiration as a matter of law. Brody had two years to perform and 
provision was made and communicated to her about how to close a 
sale without the necessity of the Mills being present. 
Brody determined to sell the condominium as her only method of 
financing the Option and profiting thereby, but simply ran out of 
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time. The attempt by her husband to orally buy another five or six 
weeks to close the sale of the condominium to a third party in 
order to exercise the Option never rose to the level of a clear, 
unequivocal and definite understanding between the parties 
necessary to overcome the statute of frauds. Follow up written 
correspondence fails to support the claim of an oral extension. 
Evidence of estoppel or part performance, if it could be considered 
at all, is insufficient. The trial court's decision is sound and 
should be summarily affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this )C ~ day of April, 1996. 
STOKER & SWINTON 
J e f f r e y C^7ffisw^ton 
Att&cneys (jro^XAppellees 
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